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INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union
has always been somewhat half-hearted. This goes back to the very
early days, when negotiations started first on what became the
European Coal and Steel Community, and history repeated itself in
the negotiations leading up to what became the European
Communities. That the preference for intergovernmental, rather than
supranational, cooperation was a second-rate choice only gradually
*
B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976, London University (LSE);
Barrister, Middle Temple, 1978; LL.D. Utrecht University 1985; Professor of European Law
& Jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jean Monnet Centre of
Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium). This paper is a vastly
extended and updated version of two presentations I gave at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools in San Francisco. I am grateful to Professor Roger
Goebel from Fordham Law School and Professor Leo Martinez of the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law for their kind invitations to speak, and to the European Law
Faculties Association, of which I was President in 2015—2016, for facilitating my attendance.
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dawned on the British establishment, and by the time the potential
suitor was ready to tie the knot, the bride was playing hard to get – or
at least General de Gaulle, like a parent who disapproves of a
potential marriage, made it clear that the time was not yet ripe.1 A
second attempt in 1967 under the Labour Prime Minister Harold
Wilson also left bride and suitor far from the altar. Only after de
Gaulle’s departure from power did France change its mind. The
Conservative government in the United Kingdom under Prime
Minister Edward Heath (who had led the British negotiating team first
time round) brought negotiations to a successful conclusion, resulting
in the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities
on January 1, 1973. Ireland and Denmark also acceded on that date.
Accession was accomplished, from the UK’s viewpoint,
perfectly orthodoxly in accordance with its dualist approach to
international legal obligations. Domestic legal effect of European
Community law was ensured through an Act of Parliament, the
European Communities Act 1972. That Act functioned as the horse
on which European law rode into the United Kingdom, and, once
there, dismounted and went about its business without further
recourse to the horse. That is not to say that the horse was of no
further value. It had many qualities: it ensured that the direct
applicability and the direct effect 2 of various types of Community
(now EU) law could be fitted into the United Kingdom’s various legal
systems;3 it also instructed the UK judiciary to take judicial notice of
judgments and expressions of opinion by the European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) and to have regard to the principles laid down by and
any decision of the ECJ, and to treat questions of (now) EU law as
questions of law, not as questions of fact4 (which is how questions of
1.
See, generally, MIRIAM CAMPS, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1955—1963 (1964); RICHARD MAYNE, THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE (1970). For a
useful brief summary of the process leading to the accession of the United Kingdom to the
European Communities, see PAUL J. G. KAPTEYN & PIETER VERLOREN VAN
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 17-21
(Laurence W. Gormley ed., 3rd ed.1998).
2. The concept of direct applicability means that no further action at European or
national level is necessary for a particular provision of EU law to be operational; the concept
of direct effect relates to whether a person can rely on a particular provision of EU law in
judicial or administrative proceedings. While these concepts were confusingly initially used
interchangeably, this is no longer generally done, even in Leiden. See Kapteyn & Van
Themaat, supra note 1, at 526.
3. For key provisions, see European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, § 2(1), (2), (4).
4.
See id. § 3(1), (2).
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foreign law are treated in the UK). But those initial instructions
having been given, the rights and obligations under European law
were applied in accordance with European law itself.
The marriage between the UK and the Communities got into a
rocky period politically, with the election of a Labour government in
February 1974 and its re-election in October of that year. A
renegotiation of certain (mainly financial) aspects followed, and a
referendum was held in June 1975, in which just over two thirds of
those who voted were in favor of remaining in the Communities. 5
Financial considerations were also the background to Margaret
Thatcher’s negotiation of a budgetary rebate for the UK in 1980, on
the well-known legal basis of wanting a large part of her money
back.6
While the love of money is the root of all evil,7 there was more
to the disquiet than merely money. On the right wing of the
Conservative party, shrill voices protested about of loss of
sovereignty and being run by Brussels; the UK Parliament only rather
grudgingly accepted the idea of direct elections to the European
Parliament.8 The Labour Party for many years in the 1980s was also
not exactly pro-European; only in the 1990s did it change its stance,
and embrace support for European integration. Margaret Thatcher’s
Bruges Speech, delivered on December 20, 1988 at the College of

5.
See Ronald Irving, The United Kingdom Referendum, June 1975, 1 EUR. L. REV. 3
(1976). See also Vaughne Miller, The 1974—75 U.K. Renegotiation of EEC Membership and
Referendum,
HOUSE
OF
COMMONS
BRIEFING
PAPER
No.
7253,
http://researchbriefings.parliament.U.K./ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7253.
6.
See Michael Jenkin, Britain and the Community Budget: The end of a chapter, 17
C.M.L. REV. 493 (1980).
7.
1 Timothy 6:10 (King James).
8.
See European Assembly Elections Act 1978, § 6, which provided that no new treaty
providing for an increase in the power of the Assembly should be ratified unless approved by
an Act of Parliament. This provision was then re-enacted as section 12 of the European
Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. The Assembly was the old name for the European
Parliament, which decided to start using the latter name on 30 March 1962. See the
Resolutions of 20 March 1958, 1958 J.O. 6/58; Resolutions of 30 March 1962, 1962 J.O.
1045/62. Article 3(1) of the Single European Act brought the name ‘European Parliament’ into
the Treaties officially, although that name had long been used in official documents. See, e.g.,
Decision of the Governments of the Member States concerning the Provisional Location of
Certain Institutions and Departments of the Communities, 1967 J.O. P 152/18; see, e.g.,
Council Decision 76/787, 1976 O.J. 278/1, corr. 1976 O.J. L 326/32, and its annexed Act
concerning the election of representatives to the European Parliament. As to the European
Parliament, see RICHARD CORBETT, FRANCIS JACOBS & DARREN NEVILLE, THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (9th. ed., 2016).
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Europe in Bruges,9 inspired the formalization of thought on the right
of the political spectrum, first in the Bruges Group and later in the
development of the United Kingdom Independence Party (“UKIP”).
This latter group was originally established by historian Alan Sked,
and was initially little more than a fringe, one-issue group; it became
a populist party in later years, achieving “major party” status in 2014.
Increasingly Europhobe sentiments in Conservative selection
committees led to significant intakes of Eurosceptic Members of
Parliament into the House of Commons—not a majority of
Conservatives, by any means, but enough to cause difficulties. This
meant that in times of small majorities, they had to be taken into
account by the sitting government. Step by step the distrust of the
European Union became more evident, and the European Union
(Amendment) Act 2008 required the approval by Act of Parliament
before ratification by the United Kingdom of any alteration of the
competences of the European Union, or its decision-making processes
or institutions, in such a way as to dilute the influence of individual
Member States. 10 This pattern was taken a step further in the
European Union Act 2011. 11 In July 2012 the UK government
launched a review of the balance of competences, an audit of what the
European Union was doing and how it affected the United Kingdom.
Like many government initiatives, it was launched with much
trumpeting, but when the results of the wide-ranging consultation
came in, the overall conclusion was that the balance was actually just
9.
See Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, Speech to the College of Europe: The
“Bruges Speech” (Sep. 20, 1988) (transcript available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/
document/107332).
10. See European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, c. 7, §§ 5, 6 (requiring ministers not
to vote in favor of any decision under certain articles of the Treaty on European Union
(“TEU”) and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) without prior
parliamentary approval). As to the latest consolidated version of the Treaty on European
Union, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016 O.J. C 202/1
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. As to the latest consolidated version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, 2016 O.J. C 202/13 [hereinafter TFEU].
11. The European Union Act 2011 imposed various restrictions on the ratification by
ministers of amendments to or replacement of the TEU and the TFEU, and on the approval of
certain decisions under the simplified revision procedure, as well as various restrictions of
agreement to other types of measures without prior parliamentary approval. See European
Union Act 2011, c. 12, §§ 2-12. Moreover, section 18 of that Act provided that directly
applicable or directly effective EU law fell to be recognized and available in law in the United
Kingdom only by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 or where it was required to be
recognized and available in law by virtue of any other Act of Parliament. See European Union
Act 2011, c. 12, § 18.
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about right; such an unwelcome conclusion led to all mention of the
results being quietly dropped.12
On January 23, 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron
announced in his “Bloomberg Speech”13 that he would be seeking a
new treaty, or at least a renegotiation, to meet British concerns. It
took a long time for the British government to specify in detail
changes it wanted to see; indeed, it was not until a letter of November
10, 2015 that the issues of concern were formally raised. 14 In the
Conservative party’s 2015 general election manifesto, Cameron
committed his government to holding a referendum, should the
Conservatives be elected.15 In this case that manifesto commitment
was honored in what became the European Union Referendum Act
2015. That Act did not provide for any threshold either concerning
turnout or the majority. The referendum was held after negotiations
had taken place on the issues raised in Cameron’s letter of the
previous November. Those negotiations resulted in “A New
Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union.”16 As
seems to be customary when the people are consulted on issues that
have been the subject of international negotiations, scant regard was
paid to this new settlement in the referendum campaign: the
referendum was about “in or out” rather than what had been agreed,
although a vote to remain would have triggered a notification to the
Secretary General of the Council of the European Union that the
United Kingdom would remain a member of the European Union.
The original referendum question proposed was, “Should the United
Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” The options
would have been to vote “Yes” or “No.” However, the UK Electoral
12. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES
AND EUROPEAN UNION LAWS AND REGULATION, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/review-ofthe-balance-of-competences (guidance on contributions); Tony Brown, The Curious Incident
of the UK Competences Review, THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/the-curious-incident-of-the-ukcompetences-review (discussion of how the results were effectively sidelined).
13. See David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, EU Speech at Bloomberg
(Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.gov.U.K./government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg.
14. Letter from David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, to Donald Tusk,
President, European Council (Nov. 10, 2015) (writing about a new settlement for the United
Kingdom in a Reformed European Union), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf.
15. See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, 72-73, https://www.conservatives.com/
manifesto pp 72-73.
16. Eur. Council Notice (New Settlement), 2016 O.J. C 69I/1.
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Commission, when consulted by political parties, decided that this
should be redrafted to read, “Should the United Kingdom remain a
member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” The
options became to vote “Remain a member of the European Union”
or “Leave the European Union.” Paul Craig has rightly and eloquently
described Brexit, as it is now known, as “a drama in six acts,” and
peppered his views with apposite quotations from Shakespeare.17
On June 23, 2016, the referendum took place. After a campaign
in which regard for factual accuracy was sacrificed on the altar of
almost visceral hatred of the European Union in Eurosceptic circles,
72.2 percent of those entitled to vote exercised their right to do so.
51.9 percent of those who voted opted to support the leave campaign,
and 48.1 percent opted to support the remain campaign. While a
majority supported the leave campaign numerically, it is clear that
less than half of the entire population that was entitled to vote did so.
It is no exaggeration to say that the campaign was characterized by
blatant lies, whipping up fears, and populist rhetoric.18 Given that the
popular press, and some sections of the allegedly “quality” press, had
for years been none too careful about objective reporting about the
European Union, the charms of little England and the superficial
populist attractions of UKIP resonated rather like the sirens of the
Lorelei, luring voters onto the rocks. Cameron duly resigned, having
effectively sacrificed the UK’s membership of the European Union to
feed the baying hounds of the right wing in his own party and the
yelping of UKIP. After a drama within the Conservative party
resembling a Shakespearean tragedy, Theresa May succeeded him as
Prime Minister, determined to follow the referendum result. While the
referendum result was not legally binding, in political terms it was
fiendishly difficult to ignore.

17.
Paul Craig, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts 40 EUR. L. REV. 447 (2016).
18. David Davis, a prominent ‘leave’ campaigner who is presently the Secretary of
State for exiting the European Union, has been reported as finding the untruths in the
campaign unimportant. Jon Stone, Brexit Secretary David Davis says EU referendum
campaign untruths ‘not important’, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 4, 2016, 2:45 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-davis-brexit-secretary-eu-referendumcampaign-lies-a7344611.html (last visited May 9, 2017). Richard Corbett MEP hosts a useful
list of ‘Brexit Lies’: see Richard Corbett, Brexit Lies, http://www.richardcorbett.org.U.K./longlist-leave-lies/ (last visited May 9, 2017); see also Brexit Lies, http://brexitlies.com (last
visited May 9, 2017).
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I. THE LEAVING MECHANISM
Leaving the European Union has always been possible, but it is
only since the changes to the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”),
made by the Treaty of Lisbon, that a special procedure has been
established. This is set out in Article 50 of the TEU and is itself
perfectly orthodox, proclaiming in Article 50(1) that, “[a]ny Member
State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its
own constitutional requirements.” The mechanics of leaving are then
set out in Article 50(2): the Member State concerned will notify the
European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European
Union. The European Council (without the member representing the
withdrawing Member State) 19 then provides guidelines for the
negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with the withdrawing
Member State, “setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal,
taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the
Union.” The negotiations are to be carried out in accordance with
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (“TFEU”). The European Commission, accordingly, will
submit recommendations to the Council, which will confer upon the
Commission a negotiating mandate and nominate the European
Union’s negotiator or head of the European Union’s negotiating team.
The Commission, when the referendum result became clear,
designated Michel Barnier, a former member of the Commission, to
act as Chief Negotiator of its Task Force for the Preparation and
Conduct of the Negotiations. The Council has the power to choose, as
it invariably does, to address directives to the negotiator (done in the
negotiating mandate) and to establish a special committee in
consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted. In due
course the negotiator will make a proposal to the Council as to the
signature and conclusion of the agreement.20 The Council will then
conclude the agreement on behalf of the European Union, acting by
qualified majority vote,21 after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament.

19.
TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 10, art. 50(4) ¶ 1.
20.
TFEU, supra note 10, art. 218 ¶¶ 3-6.
21.
TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 10, art. 50(4) ¶ 2 provides that a qualified majority
is to be determined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) TFEU, i.e. at least 72% of the
members of the Council representing the (here) 27 participating Member States, comprising at
least 65% of the population of those 27 States, must be in favor.
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A number of points stand out here. First, the agreement is an
agreement concluded by the Council with the United Kingdom; it is
not a mixed agreement concluded by the Council and the twentyseven remaining States on the one hand, with the United Kingdom on
the other. Secondly, the normal special committee procedure may
prove somewhat cumbersome, given the political involvement of the
European Council, although the Council would not even contemplate
leaving the Commission to conduct the negotiations without some
form of a special committee hovering behind the latter’s back in some
form or other. Third, the fact that the Council will act by a qualified
majority will limit the blackmail possibilities for individual Member
States seeking to “punish” the United Kingdom. Fourth, it would
appear that the withdrawal agreement will embrace the future
relationship of the United Kingdom with the European Union, but it
might be that a “hard Brexit” would result in a simple withdrawal
treaty, or, as will be apparent from what follows below, even no
treaty; the question of a future relationship would have to be
subsequently worked out. Fifth, it would be possible for the European
Parliament to refuse its consent. If this happened, then the two-year
curtain (or the curtain at the end of an agreed extended period) would
simply fall, as the proposed agreement would not have entered into
force. This prospect makes it less likely that the European Parliament
would withhold its consent, unless it felt that the European Union
would be better off with no deal at all than with an agreement that the
European Parliament regarded as unsatisfactory. Finally, while there
is no mention of a Member State withdrawing its notification of
intention to leave, it is inconceivable that this could not be done if the
political landscape changed or if the conclusion was reached that it
would be in the United Kingdom’s best interests not to press ahead
with withdrawal. While the likelihood of either of these occurring in
the present political climate in the United Kingdom may be slight to
downright zero, it is certainly not obvious that the notification under
Article 50(2) of the TEU is a one-way street.22
22. Both the Divisional Court and the U.K. Supreme Court treated Article 50(2) as
being irreversible, given that the parties to the litigation in The Queen on the application of
Miller et al v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin)
& The Queen on the application of Miller et al v Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union [2017] U.K.SC 5 were of the view that this was the case, so the courts did not bother to
rule on the issue. The question whether Article 50(2) is reversible is a question of EU law
itself, so if the U.K. courts had not taken the view they did, they would have had little option
but to refer the question for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. That
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By virtue of Article 50(3) of the TEU, the TEU and TFEU will
cease to apply to the United Kingdom from the date of entry into
force of the withdrawal agreement; if no agreement has been reached
within two years of the notification of the United Kingdom’s intention
to withdraw, the TEU and TFEU will cease to apply to the United
Kingdom as from the expiry of that two-year period, unless the
European Council, acting unanimously, and in agreement with the
United Kingdom, decides to extend that period.
In a communiqué after the informal meeting of the Heads of
State or Government of twenty-seven Member States, as well as the
Presidents of the European Council and the Commission in Brussels
on December 15, 2016,23 the procedures that will be followed were
set out. After the notification by the United Kingdom under Article 50
of the TFEU, the European Council will adopt guidelines defining the
framework for negotiations, and setting out the overall positions and
principles that the European Union will pursue during those
negotiations; these guidelines will be updated during the negotiations
as necessary. The European Council will then invite the Council
(meeting in the composition for general affairs) to adopt quickly a
decision authorizing the opening of negotiations following a
recommendation by the Commission and dealing with subsequent
steps in the process. The negotiating directives will also be adopted
by the Council; these will deal with substance and with the
relationship between the Council and its preparatory bodies on the
one hand and the union negotiator on the other. The negotiating
directives may be amended and supplemented as appropriate during
the negotiations to reflect the guidelines from the European Council
as they evolve. Appropriately, the Council will be invited to nominate
the Commission as EU negotiator, which effectively confirms that
Barnier will, as expected, lead the negotiations. The significant
development lies in how the links between the negotiator and the
Council, and the European Council will be ensured; here,
transparency and trust-building have been central considerations.
Barnier’s team will integrate a representative of the rotating
would have involved considerable delay, even if the ECJ would have been willing to expedite
the case; given the political climate in the U.K. such delay would have been distinctly
unfortunate to put it mildly. Sometimes neglecting the elephant in the room may be the better
option.
23. Press Release from the President of the European Council, 782/16 (available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/12/47244652443_en.pdf).
The
following discussion briefly sets out the proposed approach.
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Presidency of the Council; representatives of the President of the
European Council will be present and participate, in a supporting role,
in all the negotiation sessions alongside the representatives of the
Commission. As might be expected, the EU negotiator is to report
systematically to the European Council, the Council, and its
preparatory bodies. Between meetings of the European Council, the
Council, and Coreper,24 assisted by a dedicated working party with a
permanent chair, are to ensure that the negotiations are conducted in
line with the European Council guidelines and the Council
negotiating directives, and provide guidance to the EU negotiator. In
accordance with Article 50(4) of the TEU, the representatives of the
United Kingdom in the European Council, the Council, and its
preparatory bodies will not participate in the discussions or decisions
concerning it. The representatives of the twenty-seven Heads of State
and Government will be involved in the preparation of the European
Council as necessary, and representatives of the European Parliament
will be invited to attend preparatory meetings. The EU negotiator will
be requested to keep the European Parliament closely and regularly
informed throughout the negotiations, and the Presidency of the
Council will be willing to inform and exchange views with the
European Parliament before and after each meeting of the Council
(again in the composition for general affairs). Finally, the President of
the European Council will be invited to be heard at the beginning of
the meetings of the European Council. This last point is nothing new,
as it is standard practice anyway.
From the United Kingdom’s point of view, withdrawal, like
accession, would be internationally effected by exercise of the Royal
Prerogative, by the government acting in the name of the Crown;
ratification of the withdrawal agreement reached would be subject to
the negative resolution procedure envisaged in section 20 of the
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. If Parliament
attempted to restrain ratification, the prospect of the curtain of Article
50(3) of TFEU falling would still loom. If no agreement had been
reached and the curtain of Article 50(3) of the TEU fell, Parliament’s
role, as there would be no treaty to be ratified, would simply be
confined to the domestic sphere. Domestically, the European
24. Coreper is the acronym (from the French name comité des représantants
permanents) for the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the governments of the
Member States (i.e. their ambassadors to the EU). See TFEU supra note 10, art. 240(1), (2016)
O.J. C 202/154.
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Communities Act 1972 and related legislation would need to be
repealed, and that repeal would need to be coordinated with the actual
date of withdrawal. This could be achieved by the not unusual
procedure of making the coming into force of the repeal legislation
effective through an Order in Council or a statutory instrument
specifying the appropriate date. But before that stage was in sight, a
discussion emerged about whether the government could “pull the
Article 50 trigger” without first obtaining the agreement of the UK
Parliament.
II. CONSULTING THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT?
The rights conferred by European law, carried in by the horse of
the European Communities Act 1972, enure to the benefit of
European citizens and market participants, according to the content of
the rights concerned. Although they rode on that proverbial horse,
they are conferred by EU law itself. While, as observed above, 25
section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 attempted to make UK
legislation itself the basis of these rights and indeed duties, they are in
reality founded firmly in EU law itself. The UK Parliament, when
enacting the European Communities Act 1972, assented to those
rights and duties having effect within the United Kingdom, but did
not thereby make that act the source of those rights and duties; the act
is a vehicle (a horse) rather than the source. Given that Parliament had
clearly intended EU law to have effect within the United Kingdom,
should not Parliament have to decide on whether the British
government should take steps that could lead to those rights and
duties becoming effective?
The UK government’s intention to trigger the Article 50 of the
TFEU mechanism without seeking the prior authority of Parliament
was challenged in The Queen on the application of Miller et al. v.
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.26 The case came
before a particularly strong Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division of the High Court.27 The Divisional Court, as seen above,
avoided the issue of deciding whether a notification under Article 50
of the TFEU was reversible. That is itself a question of EU law, and
25.
See European Union Act 2011, supra note 11.
26. In the Divisional Court [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), upheld on appeal [2017]
U.K.SC 5 (hereinafter Miller).
27. Id. Consisting of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales (Lord Thomas of
Cwmgiedd); the Master of the Rolls (Sir Terence Etherton) and Lord Justice Sales.
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had the court felt it necessary to decide that point in order to give
judgment, it would have had little choice but to make a reference for a
preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the TFEU to the ECJ, as there
is no existing authority on the question. This would have caused
considerable delay in deciding the case, which would have been
particularly politically sensitive in view of the rabble rousing in the
press baying for Brexit rather yesterday than tomorrow.
The Divisional Court was at pains to emphasize that it was
dealing with the question of law, and that nothing it said had
concerned the question of the merits of withdrawal from the European
Union, nor because government policy is not law did the court’s
decision have any bearing on government policy.28 Even though the
European Communities Act 1972 gave effect to the supremacy of EU
law, and that measure remained the only instance of Parliament
recognizing a superior form of law than primary legislation, the
doctrine that Parliament is sovereign and could always repeal primary
legislation, including the European Communities Act 1972 remained
unabated. 29 The Royal Prerogative covered only the prerogative
powers recognized by common law and their exercise produced legal
effects only within those boundaries; thus, while it did embrace the
making of treaties, it did not extend to altering or conferring rights
upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they
enjoyed in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament.30
The Divisional Court recognized that the European Communities
Act 1972 was a constitutional statute, approving in particular the
approach adopted by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn v. Sunderland
City Council.31 The Act was not subject to the usual wide principle of
implied repeal by subsequent legislation; its importance was such that
could only be repealed or amended by express language and
subsequent statute or by necessary implication from the provisions of
such a statute.32
The key to the discussion in the Divisional Court lies in the
rights arising under EU law which would be affected by withdrawal
from the European Union, although that court rightly recognized that
28.
Id. at ¶ 5 of the Divisional Court’s judgment in Miller.
29.
Id. at ¶. 20—21.
30. J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2
AC 418 (HL) 500 (per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton).
31.
[2003] QB 151 (DC) [¶ 62].
32. Divisional Court’s judgment in Miller, supra note 26, at ¶ 44.
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there were many other a substantial areas of EU law which took effect
as part of the law of the United Kingdom as directly applicable
regulations. These rights were analyzed in three categories:
● Rights which could be replicated in United Kingdom law.
These rights could be maintained in whole or in part after the
withdrawal through re-enactment; this could be done either on an
individual basis (such as in the area of employee rights) or as part
of an overall maintenance of existing rights through means of a
proposed Great Repeal Bill. However, there would be no
possibility of making a reference to the ECJ about these rights
after withdrawal. The Divisional Court held that even if such
rights were to be preserved under new primary legislation within
the United Kingdom after withdrawal, withdrawal would have
deprived the domestic law rights created by the European
Communities Act 1972 of their effect. Moreover, the removal of
the ability to seek a preliminary ruling from the ECJ under
Article 267 of the TFEU relating to the scope and interpretation
of those rights would itself amount to a material change in the
domestic laws of the United Kingdom.33
● Rights which British citizens and companies enjoyed in other
Member States of the European Union. These are rights of
residence and the freedoms to pursue economic activities (as
workers, self-employed, service providers (or recipients), or as
retirees or students or persons of independent means, and rights
of companies to establish branches and agencies in other Member
States). Besides being enforceable in the domestic courts of other
Member States, these rights could also be invoked by such
citizens and companies against impedimenta imposed by the
United Kingdom; again, the enforcement and interpretation of
those rights could benefit from the procedure of Article 267 of
the TFEU. The Divisional Court had little difficulty in
concluding that these rights would be affected by withdrawal,
and that they were rights which Parliament intended to bring into
effect through the European Communities Act 1972.34
● Rights that could not be replicated in United Kingdom law.
These rights embraced citizens’ rights, such as the right to vote in
and stand for elections to the European Parliament, as well as
broader rights, such as the right to request a court to make a
reference under Article 267 of the TFEU or to benefit from the

33. Id. at ¶ 64.
34. Id. at ¶ 66.

1188 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:4

possibility of persuading the European Commission to take
action in relation to the enforcement and application of EU law
within the United Kingdom (for example in relation to
infringement of competition law or environmental protection
legislation within the United Kingdom), and to seek appropriate
remedies. Given that these rights were acknowledged by the
Secretary of State to be at least in part the product of the
European Communities Act 1972 the Divisional Court did not
deal with them further.

The Divisional Court then proceeded to give the Secretary of
State a lesson in statutory interpretation of constitutional statutes. In
situations in which the constitutional principles are strong, the courts
find that there is a presumption that Parliament intended to legislate in
conformity with them, and not to undermine them. The text of the
statute must be read in the light of constitutional principle: could it be
inferred in the particular context of the primary legislation being
interpreted that a Parliament, aware of that constitutional principle
and respectful of it, still intended to produce effects at variance with
that principle? Although many presumptions could be overridden by
Parliament if it chose to do so, the stronger the constitutional
principle, the stronger the presumption that Parliament did not intend
to override it, and the stronger the requirement of express language or
clear necessary implication for the inference can be properly drawn
that Parliament did intend to override it. Likewise, the stronger the
constitutional principle, the stronger the argument that Parliament’s
language was intended to reflect that principle. The Secretary of State
had studiously ignored the constitutional principle that the Crown
could not vary the law of the land by the exercise of its prerogative
powers without the authority of Parliament.35 In view of the important
and far-reaching step that Parliament had taken in switching on the
direct effect of EU law in the UK legal systems by enacting the
European Communities Act 1972, the Divisional Court felt it not
plausible to suppose that Parliament intended that the Crown should
be able to switch off direct effect again simply by unilateral action
using prerogative powers. Furthermore, the status of the European
Communities Act 1972, as a constitutional statute, was such that
Parliament is taken to have indicated that it should be exempt from
the operational usual doctrine of implied repeal by subsequent
inconsistent legislation; it was all the more unlikely that Parliament
35. Id. at ¶¶ 82—85.
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intended that the rights thereby conferred could be revoked by the
unilateral use of prerogative powers.36
The Divisional Court concluded that in the light of the above it
was clear that Parliament intended to legislate by the European
Communities Act 1972 to introduce EU law into domestic law and to
create the rights in the second category, which could not be undone
by the exercise of Crown prerogative powers. Rights from the first
and third categories, as well as the wider rights in the second
category, also depended on the continued existence of the European
Communities Act 1972, which had brought them into domestic law.37
The press reaction to this judgment essentially called a lynch
mob against the distinguished judges involved, and regrettably,
several politicians were lukewarm (to say the least) in their support
for the independence of the judiciary—a phenomenon also currently
evident in the United States. Unsurprisingly, the Secretary of State
appealed to the UK Supreme Court. Prior to the hearing, there were
clear attempts to intimidate some of the Justices into recusing
themselves, but the Supreme Court very wisely took the view that
such a step was unnecessary – the activities did not affect their
judicial independence – and decided to hear the case en banc. Again,
the Justices rightly stressed that their judgment had nothing to do with
the political wisdom of Brexit.
The majority of the Supreme Court, formed by eight out of the
eleven Justices, 38 took the view that although the European
Communities Act 1972 gave effect to EU law, it was not the
originating source of that law.39 The majority spoke of that Act as a
conduit,40 which is a slightly different metaphor than that of the horse
invoked above, although nothing turns on the distinction, and the
36. Id. at ¶¶ 86—88.
37. Id. at ¶ 92. The Divisional Court then summarized the background to its conclusion
in paragraphs 93—94 of its judgment. It then turned to deal with the applicants’ arguments,
concluding that in reality the Secretary of State was proposing to take away the rights of
citizens given effect by Parliament through the use of prerogative powers. The final parts of
the judgment discussed other issues that did not affect the conclusion.
38. Lord Neuberger (President); Lady Hale (Vice President); Lord Mance; Lord Kerr;
Lord Clarke; Lord Wilson; Lord Sumption, and Lord Hodge.
39. The Queen on the application of Miller et al v. Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [62]—[65].
40. Id. at ¶ 65 (echoing the metaphor used by John Finnis in his Sir Thomas Moore
Lecture in 2016; accessible at http://www.lincolnsinn.org.U.K./images/word/education/
Sir%20Thomas%20More%20Lecture%20-%20Professor%20John%20Finnis%20FBA.pdf
(delivered after the judgment of the Divisional Court discussed above).
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horse could not be said to be in any way unruly. The majority
examined the categories of rights identified by the Divisional Court
and concluded that given that it was clear that some of the rights in
first category would be lost on the United Kingdom withdrawing from
the European Union, it was unnecessary to consider whether the
applicants could rely on the loss of rights in the second and third
categories. The majority took the view that if they could not succeed
in their argument based on loss of rights in the first category, then
invoking loss of rights in the other categories would not help, and if
they could succeed on the basis of loss of rights in the first category,
they would not need to invoke loss of rights in the other categories.41
The majority took the view that the loss of the source of law which
would result from withdrawal was a fundamental legal change which
justified the conclusion that prerogative powers could not be invoked
to withdraw from the EU Treaties. The majority also upheld the
Divisional Court’s view that the changes in domestic rights acquired
through EU law was another, albeit related, ground for justifying that
conclusion. The consequences of withdrawal went further than
affecting the rights acquired pursuant to Section 2 of the European
Communities Act 1972. That Act envisaged domestic law, and
therefore rights of UK citizens, changing as EU law varies, but it did
not envisage those rights changing as a result of ministers unilaterally
deciding that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the EU
Treaties. 42 The effect of the European Communities Act 1972 was
that ministers required the authority of Parliament before giving
notice of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw,43 a conclusion
that was unaffected by subsequent legislation or by the referendum of
2016; in any event, deciding on whether to act on the result of the
referendum was a matter for Parliament.44
41.
The Queen on the application of Miller et al v. Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at ¶ 73.
42.
Id. at ¶ 83.
43.
Id. at ¶ 101.
44.
See id. at ¶ 116—25. The remaining part of the majority judgment dealt with
issues relating to Northern Ireland, and devolution: the majority in the Supreme Court
concluded that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly did not have a legal veto over
withdrawal from the European Union, nor did the Northern Ireland Assembly. Id. at ¶¶ 135,
150. The “Sewell Convention” that the United Kingdom Parliament would not normally
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the devolved Parliaments was
considered to be a political convention, rather than a rule that was justiciable. Id. at ¶¶ 136—
51. The three dissenting judgments can be briefly summarized. Lord Reed, whose minority
judgment was the most extensively reasoned, felt that the effect that Parliament had given to
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This sensible approach recognizes that EU law itself is a
dynamic body of law, which is constantly developing. The Treaties
are the skeletons on which flesh is constructed by the acts of the
Union institutions, and the skeletons are extended by the Member
States through Treaty amendments. The rights and obligations
brought into being by EU law were never intended to be static, and
they have developed through the years as the ECJ looks at the present
state of Union law at the snapshot moment of a judgment.
It was clear that the UK government had to go back to
Parliament. It did so, and after an initial rebellion in the House of
Lords, the notably brief European Union (Notification of Withdrawal)
Act 2017 received the Royal Assent on March 16, 2017. Parliament
thus granted permission to ministers to trigger the Article 50 of the
TFEU mechanism.
III. THE PROCESS STARTS
On March 29, 2016, Theresa May wrote to Donald Tusk, the
President of the European Council notifying body in accordance with
Article 50(2) of the TEU of the United Kingdom’s intention to
withdraw from the European Union and, on the same basis, as applied
by Article 106a of the Euratom Treaty,45 from the European Atomic
Energy Community. 46 Certain points expressed in this letter are of
particular (largely political) interest: the expression about the deep
EU law in U.K. domestic law by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 was inherently
conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the U.K. and thus on the latter’s
membership of the Union. He argued that that Act did not affect the Crown’s exercise of
prerogative powers in respect of membership. Since, in his view, no alteration in the
fundamental rule governing the recognition of sources of law had resulted from membership of
the EU, or would result from notification under Article 50 TFEU, Ministers were entitled to
give notification under Article 50 in the exercise of prerogative powers, without requiring
authorization by a further Act of Parliament. Lord Carnwath, agreeing with Lord Reed, felt
that the Divisional Court took too narrow a view of the constitutional principles involved; he
argued that although the Article 50 TFEU process involved a partnership between Parliament
and executive, that did not mean that legislation was required simply to initiate it, although
legislation would be required to implement withdrawal. That process, including the form and
timing of any legislation could and should be determined by Parliament not by the courts. Lord
Hughes delivered a brief judgment, agreeing with Lord Reed.
45.
See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, 2016 O.J. C 203/01 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty].
46. Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, to Donald Tusk,
President, European Council (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.gov.U.K./government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_Pr
esident_Donald_Tusk.pdf.
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and special partnership the United Kingdom hopes to enjoy – as the
European Union’s closest friend and neighbor – with the European
Union after leaving it; the proposal for constructive and respectful
engagement in a spirit of sincere cooperation; the importance of
striking early agreement about the rights of citizens of the other
twenty-seven Member States living in the United Kingdom and of the
UK citizens living in the other twenty-seven Member States; the
importance of economic and security co-operation; the importance of
working together to minimize disruption and give as much certainty
as possible; the importance of special attention to the United
Kingdom’s unique relationship with Ireland and the importance of the
peace process in Northern Ireland; the suggestion that the technical
talks on detailed policy areas should begin soon as possible with the
biggest challenges prioritized; and an intention to continue to work
together to advance and protect European values. One particular
element that attracted attention in relation to the deep and special
partnership was that it would take in both economic and security of
cooperation. In some circles this was interpreted as a thinly veiled
threat that if there were no agreement on economic matters, there
would be none on security cooperation, although this impression was
fortunately quickly dispelled.47
The immediate reaction of Donald Tusk48 in part reflected these
issues, but also made it clear that the European Union had other
concerns as well. Tusk stressed, first, the European Union’s duty to
minimise the uncertainty and disruption caused by the United
Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union for EU
citizens, businesses, and Member States. This would essentially be
about damage control. Putting people first, he emphasized the need to
settle the status and situations of EU citizens in the United Kingdom
after the withdrawal with reciprocal, enforceable, and nondiscriminatory guarantees. It would also be important to address the
legal vacuum for companies arising from the fact that after Brexit the
EU laws would no longer apply to the United Kingdom. The third
point he made was that the European Union would also need to make
sure that the United Kingdom honoured all financial commitments
47.
See Joe Watts, Brexit: Theresa May forced into embarrassing climbdown over
Article 50 negotiations security ‘threat’, INDEPENDENT (Mar., 31, 2017),
http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/U.K./politics/brexit-theresa-may-article-50negotiations-security-threat-latest-leave-eu-european-union-a7659466.html.
48.
See Letter from Theresa May to Donald Tusk, supra note 46.
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and liabilities it had made and taken as a Member State. The logic
behind this point lies in the multiannual commitments made in respect
of policies such as research, agriculture, and regional, economic, and
social cohesion, where all twenty-eight Member States made financial
commitments. Tusk emphasized that the European Union, on its part,
would honour all its commitments. The fourth point was the
commitment to seek flexible and creative solutions aiming at avoiding
a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland; supporting the
peace process in Northern Ireland was crucial. Tusk observed that
these four issues formed part of the first phase of the negotiations, and
only once sufficient progress on the withdrawal had been achieved
could the framework for the future relationship between the European
Union and the United Kingdom commence. Tusk rejected, therefore,
the idea of starting parallel talks on all issues at the same time. This is
actually scarcely surprising, as accession negotiations proceed on a
chapter-by-chapter basis, and not all chapter negotiations take place at
the same time. The wording of Article 50(2) leaves this point
somewhat up in the air: “the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with [the withdrawing] State setting out the arrangements
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future
relationship with the Union.” While the choice for a single phase or
two-phase set of negotiations is essentially political, it is tidier, and
reflects the view that the withdrawal treaty should be a separate
document from any treaty on the future relationship between the
European Union and the withdrawing State; otherwise, the resulting
document would be messy in the extreme.
The Council’s Task Force established under leadership of Didier
Seeuws was well prepared, and the draft European Council guidelines
under Article 50(2) were made public on March 31, 2017.49 These
draft guidelines unsurprisingly dovetail with very many of the
observations already made by President Tusk. Those draft guidelines,
with only minor changes, were approved at the Special Meeting of the
European Council on April 29, 2017. 50 On May 3, 2017, the

49. GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Council Document 21001/17, Bxt 5, (Mar. 31 2017), http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.
wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf.
50. Eur. Council Document EUCO XT 20004/17, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/XT-20004-2017-INIT/en/pdf.
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Commission presented its recommendation for a Council Decision
authorizing it to open negotiations relating to U.K. withdrawal.51
The guidelines emphasise the European Council’s wish to have
the United Kingdom as a close partner in future, and they make it
plain that any agreement with the United Kingdom must be based on
the balance of rights and obligations and ensure a level playing field.
In this, the integrity of the single market assumes major importance:
participation based on a sector-by-sector approach is rejected, so there
will be no cherry picking. In line with this approach, the negotiations
will be conducted as a single package on the principle that nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed (a principle that the European Union
applies in all its negotiations, even though individual chapters in the
negotiations are closed once de facto agreement on them has been
reached), so individual items will not be settled separately. From the
European Union’s point of view, the negotiations will be conducted
with unified positions, with no separate negotiations between the
Member States and the United Kingdom on matters pertaining to its
withdrawal from the European Union; this is clearly designed to stop
Member States being open to being “bought.” While the European
Union intends to be constructive throughout and find an agreement
that is fair and equitable for all Member States and in the interests of
the Union’s citizens, which is in the best interest of both sides, the
guidelines make it clear that the European Union will also take steps
to be able to cope if the negotiations were to fail.
The phased approach emphasized by Tusk is also reflected in
point 4 of the guidelines, as is the view that the United Kingdom must
first become a third country before the arrangements on a future
relationship with the European Union can be concluded. Given the
wording of Article 50 of the TEU, an overall understanding on the
framework for future relationship could be identified during the
second phase of the negotiations under Article 50, so the European
Union will be ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory
discussions on that in the context of the negotiations under Article 50
once the European Council decides that sufficient progress has been
made in the first stage towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on
the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal.
Point 6 of the guidelines leaves open the possibility of
negotiating transitional arrangements, provided that they are in the
51. Commission Document COM (2017) 218 final.
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interest of the European Union, and, that they form appropriate
bridges towards the foreseeable framework for the future relationship.
As with transitional arrangements negotiated in relation to accession
agreements, such arrangements would have to be clearly defined,
limited in time, and with effective enforcement mechanisms. If a
time-limited prolongation of the EU acquis52 were to be considered,
existing EU regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and
enforcement instruments and structures would have to apply during
that prolongation.
In addition to the common points already highlighted in the letter
from May and Tusk’s reaction (citizens’ rights, companies, and EUfunded programs and financial issues), the guidelines stress the need
for a single financial settlement covering all legal and budgetary
commitments, as well as liabilities, including contingent liabilities.
The guidelines also note the importance of supporting the peace
process in Northern Ireland and, moreover, the aim of avoiding a hard
border on the island of Ireland, while respecting the integrity of the
European Union’s legal order. They envisage that existing bilateral
agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and
Ireland that are compatible with EU law should also be recognized.
The remaining points deal with arrangements as regards the sovereign
base areas of the United Kingdom on Cyprus: the consequences of
international commitments which the United Kingdom has contracted
in the context of its EU membership, with a possible common
approach towards third country partners and international
organizations, and arrangements for the facilitation of transfer of seats
of EU agencies and facilities located in the United Kingdom
(although this is actually a matter for the twenty-seven Member States
rather than for the European Union itself).
Of major interest to lawyers are points 16 and 17 of the
guidelines. Point 16 considers questions relating to ensuring legal
certainty and equal treatment for all court procedures pending before
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU,” i.e., the ECJ
itself or the General Court) on the date of withdrawal that involve the
United Kingdom or natural or legal persons there. The guidelines
envisage that institution remaining competent to adjudicate in those
procedures. Arrangements should also be agreed for administrative
52.
I.e. a continuation of the status quo. Whether that would mean application of
developments in the period of the transitional arrangements (as EU law is dynamic) would be
the subject of negotiation, although it is difficult to envisage from the U.K.’s viewpoint.
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procedures pending before the Commission and the EU agencies at
the date of withdrawal, involving the United Kingdom or natural or
legal persons there, as well as for the possibility of administrative or
court proceedings initiated after withdrawal in respect of facts that
occurred before the withdrawal date. Point 17 addresses the need for
appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms regarding the application
and interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, as well as duly
circumscribed institutional arrangements allowing for the adoption of
measures necessary to deal with situations not foreseen in the
withdrawal agreement. The European Union’s interest in effectively
protecting its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the
Court of Justice, will have to be borne in mind.
The remainder of the guidelines set out a number of essentially
political and economic points the brevity of which is almost in inverse
proportion to their political importance. Understandably, the
European Council welcomes and shares the United Kingdom’s desire
to establish close partnership between the European Union and the
United Kingdom after its departure; though this will not offer the
same benefits as EU membership, strong constructive ties are
regarded as remaining in both sides’ interests and should involve
more than just trade. Given that the British government had indicated
that it would not wish to remain in the single market but would like to
pursue an ambitious free-trade agreement with the European Union,
the European Council stated that it was ready to initiate work for such
an agreement, to be finalized and concluded once the United
Kingdom is no longer a Member State. Any free trade agreement
would have to be balanced, ambitious, and wide-ranging, but it could
not amount to participation in the single market or parts thereof, as
that would undermine its integrity and proper functioning. Any
agreement would have to ensure a level playing field in terms of
competition and state aid, and would have to encompass safeguards
against unfair competitive advantages through inter alia tax, social,
environmental and regulatory measures and practices. Beyond trade,
the European Union was ready to consider establishing partnership in
other areas, in particular the fight against terrorism and international
crime as well as security, defense and foreign policy. The future
partnership would have to include appropriate enforcement and
dispute settlement mechanisms that did not affect the European
Union’s autonomy, in particular its decision-making procedures.
Finally, the guidelines make clear that after the United Kingdom
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leaves the European Union, no agreement between the European
Union and the United Kingdom could apply to Gibraltar without
agreement between Spain and the United Kingdom. This last point
already caused something of a furor in certain circles in early April
2017 in the United Kingdom and in Spain, with some UK politicians
making rather unwise statements in a high and loud, even jingoistic
tone.53
On May 22, 2017, the Council adopted a decision setting out the
negotiating mandate,54 the terms of which address the first aspect of
the negotiations, the terms of withdrawal; a further negotiating
mandate will in due course address the issue of the future relationship
between the European Union and the United Kingdom. The
negotiating mandate follows closely the guidelines set out above.
Negotiations finally commenced on June 19, 2017.
IV. HOW TO WRIGGLE OUT, AND HENRY VIII POWERS
The UK government has now finally published its White Paper
on legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the
European Union.55 The White Paper heralds the introduction in due
course of a so-called Great Repeal Bill that is designed to ensure that
generally the same rules and laws will apply after the United
Kingdom leaves the European Union as before. The Great Repeal Bill
will repeal the European Community 1972 and convert EU law as it
stands at the moment of withdrawal from the European Union into
UK law before the United Kingdom actually leaves the European
Union; this is designed to ensure there is no overnight change in
rights and obligations for individuals and businesses. It is also
designed to ensure that the UK Parliament and, where appropriate, the
devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland can
make such changes as they feel appropriate at any time after the
United Kingdom has left the European Union. The Great Repeal Bill
will convert directly applicable EU law into UK law, thus ensuring
53. BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Brexit and Gibraltar: May laughs
off Spain ‘war’ talk (Apr. 3 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39475127.
54. The Council Decision and Annex (which contains the details) have surprisingly not
yet been published in the O.J., see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2017/05/22-brexit-negotiating-directives/andCouncilDocuments21009/17
BXT16and21009/17BXT16ADD1REV2.
55. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Legislating
for the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union, 2017, CM 9446 (UK).
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that there is no void resulting from present EU regulations no longer
being applicable in the United Kingdom. Those laws that have been
made in the United Kingdom in order to implement obligations
imposed by measures such as EU directives (which have to be
transposed into national law) will be preserved. Usually such
implementation was on the basis of Section 2(2) of the European
Communities Act 1972, which empowered ministers, including those
in devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,
to adopt secondary legislation to implement EU obligations. On the
repeal of that Act, legislation adopted by virtue of that Act would
cease to apply, unless preserved (in this instance) by the Great Repeal
Act.
The White Paper goes on to make it clear that the EU Treaties as
they exist at the moment the United Kingdom will leave the European
Union may well assist in the interpretation of the EU laws which the
United Kingdom intends to preserve. It is intended that directly
effective Treaty rights for individuals will be incorporated into UK
law. While the CJEU itself will no longer have jurisdiction affecting
the United Kingdom, and the existing obligation on the judiciary to
follow its case law will disappear, the White Paper intends to ensure
continuity in how European Union law is interpreted before and after
withdrawal day. The Great Repeal Bill will provide that any question
as to the meaning of EU-derived UK law is to be determined in the
UK courts by reference to the CJEU’s case law as it exists on the day
that the United Kingdom withdraws from the European Union. CJEU
case law on any aspect of EU law that is not be converted into UK
law would not need to be applied by the UK courts. The value of such
CJEU case law as a binding precedent will be the same as that of
decisions of the UK Supreme Court.56 The British government states
that it would expect the Supreme Court to take a similar approach to
departing from CJEU case law to that which it takes when departing
from its own, and is examining whether it might be desirable for any
56. UK Supreme Court Practice Statement 3 https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/
practice-direction-03.pdf (last visited May 9, 2017) states: “The Supreme Court has not reissued the House of Lords’ Practice Statement of 26 July 1966 (Practice Statement (Judicial
Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234) which stated that the House of Lords would treat former
decisions of the House as normally binding but that it would depart from a previous decision
when it appeared right to do so. The Practice Statement is “part of the established
jurisprudence relating to the conduct of appeals” and “has as much effect in [the Supreme]
Court as it did before the Appellate Committee in the House of Lords”: Austin v Mayor and
Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28, [24]—[25].
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additional steps to take to give further clarity about the circumstances
in which such departure might occur. Parliament would in any event
be free to change the law and overturn case law if it felt fit.
The White Paper also proposes that where a conflict arises
between EU-derived UK law and primary legislation passed by
Parliament after UK withdrawal from the European Union, the new
legislation will take precedence over the EU-derived UK law that has
been preserved by the Great Repeal Bill. This is the logical result of
the supremacy of EU law in the event of a conflict with national law
no longer applying in the United Kingdom. In relation to the
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, 57 the British
government’s intention is that removal of the Charter from UK law
will not affect the substantive rights which individuals already benefit
from in the United Kingdom. Article 51 of the Charter states that it
“does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the
Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” Many
of those rights exists elsewhere in the body of EU law which will be
converted into UK law, and others already exist in UK law or in
international agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party.
Given that EU law would be converted into UK law by the Great
Repeal Bill, it will continue to be interpreted by UK courts
consistently with the underlying rights which will be preserved. If
pre-withdrawal case law has been decided by reference to such
underlying rights, that case law will continue to be relevant as
explained above; but is insofar as case-law refers to the Charter, those
references will be considered as referring only to the underlying
rights, rather than the Charter.
Chapter 3 of the White Paper contains the most controversial
aspect of the British government’s proposal, referring to delegated
powers. These powers are often referred to as Henry VIII powers,58
after the Statute of Proclamations 1539. Section 2(2) of the European
Communities Act 1972 is itself a Henry VIII clause, giving ministers
the power to implement non-directly applicable EU law. But as it
relates to implementing EU legislation which has already passed
57. 2016 O.J. C 20/ 389.
58.
Joelle Grogan, Rights for the chop: how a Henry VIII clause in the Great Repeal
Bill will undermine democracy, Lsᴇ Bʀᴇxɪᴛ’s Bʟᴏɢ, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/11/30/
rights-for-the-chop-how-a-henry-viii-clause-in-the-great-repeal-bill-will-underminedemocracy/ (for a useful and clear discussion.).
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democratic scrutiny at EU level and, at least in more recent years will
also have been open to national parliamentary level scrutiny at the
proposal stage, it is inherently less far-reaching than the proposals in
the Great Repeal Bill. The problem identified by the British
government is that there will be where some areas where converted
law will be unable to operate because the United Kingdom is no
longer a member of the European Union; there will also be cases
where EU law will cease to operate as intended or will be redundant
after withdrawal. Where EU rights are based on reciprocal
arrangements, it may no longer be practical or in the United
Kingdom’s interests to maintain them unilaterally, if no reciprocal
continuity can be established as part of the new relationship between
the European Union and the United Kingdom.
The White Paper recognizes the need for justification of the
choice to use secondary rather than primary legislation, and suggests
that justifications include: matters which cannot be known or may be
liable to change at the point when the primary legislation is being
passed because the government needs to allow for the progress of
negotiations; adjustments to policy that are directly consequential on
the withdrawal from the EU; and to provide a level of detail not sort
appropriate for primary legislation. The White Paper also recognizes
the need for some limitations on the powers of ministers, not least
because it intends to use these powers in relation to primary as well as
secondary legislation which implements current EU obligations as
well as directly applicable EU law that will be converted into
domestic law on withdrawal. The government also intends to include
the power to transfer to UK bodies or ministers those powers that are
contained in EU-derived UK law and which are currently exercised
by EU bodies, although the White Paper argues that this does not
mean that the power will be wide in terms of legislation to which it
can be used to make changes. The White Paper envisages that the
power will not be available where the government wishes to make a
policy change which is not designed to deal with deficiencies in
preserved EU-derived UK law arising out of withdrawal from the EU.
Moreover, the government states that it will consider the constraints
placed on the delegated power in section 2 of the European
Communities Act 1972 to assess whether similar constraints may be
suitable for the new power (for example, preventing it from being
used to make retrospective provision or impose taxation). The White
Paper argues that if the power is too narrowly drafted, then too many
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of the changes will have to be enacted through primary legislation
before withdrawal, which would lead to an enormous crowding of
Parliamentary time. The government proposes to use existing types of
statutory procedure, which allow Parliament to see all statutory
instruments under various levels of security. The most commonly
used procedures are the negative procedure (the measure is agreed if
no objection requiring a debate and possibly even a vote is lodged by
a member of either House of Parliament within a set period) and the
affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both
Houses of Parliament before either measure can enter into force.
Moreover, Parliamentary committees scrutinize statutory instruments
for technical and policy content.
Mindful of the furor that the use of Henry VIII powers would
create, the government sees the White Paper as the beginning of
discussion between government and Parliament as to the most
pragmatic and effective approach to take in this area. The government
envisages that the corrections made by the statutory instruments will
have to be in place before the United Kingdom leaves the European
Union, and thus proposes that the power in the Great Repeal Bill will
come into force as soon as the Royal Assent is granted, so that the
process of correcting the statute book can begin immediately. Finally,
as most of the corrections can and will need to be made before the
United Kingdom leaves the European Union, the powers proposed in
the Great Repeal Bill will be time-limited to enact the necessary
changes. The White Paper also holds out the carrot of more powers
being devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in
accordance with the (unstated) principle of subsidiarity, so as to
ensure that power sits closer to the people. Devolved ministers would
be granted similar Henry VIII powers to amend devolved legislation
in order to correct a law that would no longer operate appropriately
after withdrawal from the European Union. Last, but not least, the
White Paper makes it plain that the UK government will take
appropriate steps to engage with the Crown Dependencies and
Overseas Territories in so far as necessary.
It remains to be seen to what extent the UK Parliament will
accept such a far-reaching use of delegated powers, but first reactions
have been understandably very negative. Those on the Eurosceptic
right who have long clamored that there is not enough national
parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation are hardly going to be
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impressed by attempts to restrict parliamentary scrutiny of legislative
action by UK ministers.
V. CRYSTAL BALL SCENARIOS?
The key problems are likely to center around the extent, if any,
to which the United Kingdom will retain access to the internal market
of the European Union. One obvious way to do this would have been
to change the United Kingdom’s participation in the European
Economic Area Agreement 59 (“EEA Agreement”) from a Member
State party to a non-member state party, assuming that the other
signatories would agree to such a course.60 This approach foundered
on the political obstacle that access to the internal market under the
EEA Agreement comes with a price, which unlike ancient Gaul, is in
two parts. The first element is that the United Kingdom would have to
continually adjust its legislation to reflect changes in the European
Union’s internal market legislation (to ensure continued
homogeneity), without having a vote at the table in the decisionmaking process regarding that legislation. The second element is that
the United Kingdom would be called upon to make a financial
contribution to the EU budget just as the other non-member state
signatories of the EEA Agreement have agreed to do. The UK
government has evidently ruled out such an approach.
The chosen scenario is that the United Kingdom could seek to
have a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union.
Free trade agreements can come in varying forms, but they have
tended at least to deal with the free movement of goods and services,
and may even embrace other internal market freedoms. One of the
problems with free trade agreements is that they do not seek to
achieve the same degree of integration as the original EEC Treaty, or
now the TFEU does, and that the case law applicable to identically
worded provisions of the EEC Treaty, now of the TFEU, cannot be
imported into the meaning of the free-trade agreement.61 Since then,
59. 1994 O.J. L 1/3.
60. See Dòra Sif Tynes & Elisabeth Lian Haugsdal, In, Out or in-between? The U.K. as
a contracting party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 40 EUR. L. REV. 753,
764 (2016) (explaining that this would involve amending the EEA Treaty (or withdrawing and
re-acceding) and the United Kingdom rejoining the European Free Trade Association, which it
had left on accession to the European Union).
61. See e.g. Polydor Ltd. et al. v. Harlequin Record Shops et al., Case C-270/80, [1982]
E.C.R. I-339, ¶¶ 16-18 (concerning the interpretation of the EEC Treaty).
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however, the ECJ has been able to achieve a similar result by
interpreting a free trade agreement in the light of its purpose, at least
where it was obvious that the Member State concerned already had all
the relevant information on the pharmaceutical product being
reimported.62 When the EEA Agreement was concluded, the scope of
EU legislation dealing, for example, with free movement of workers,
was expressly extended to cover nationals of the non-member state
EEA countries. This was done so that the ECJ could not use the
different integration argument to deny direct effect to the rights
created. A similar approach could be taken in the context of a
comprehensive free trade agreement with the United Kingdom.
Given that paranoia about immigration was a major factor in the
referendum campaign, it may be thought that any agreement on the
free movement of workers in particular would be a matter of some
controversy on the right wing of the Conservative party and in UKIP
circles. However, the sort of arrangements envisaged in the ill-fated
Settlement with the United Kingdom might provide some inspiration
as part of a mutually satisfactory solution in this area. A particular
variety of free trade has been achieved between the European Union
and Switzerland, which have concluded a series of agreements
relating to different aspects of the classic internal market: goods,
services, workers, establishment, capital, and payments, as well as
agreements on transport and other issues. With Switzerland, a poison
pill clause in the more recent series of agreements provides that the
consequence of failing to ratify the latest in the series of agreements
would be the collapse of rights granted under the previous
agreements. This is an incentive to vote for them in referendums,
which are commonplace in Switzerland. A similar clause could be
included in agreements with the United Kingdom if it were to follow
this route. However, it is now unlikely that this route will be
followed, given that both the United Kingdom and the European
Union appear to favor a single comprehensive and far-reaching
solution.
The United Kingdom has ruled out trying to remain part of the
customs union aspects of the European Union, but, as seen above in
the discussion of the United Kingdom’s notification of withdrawal
and the reaction by Donald Tusk and in the draft guidelines from the
62. See e.g. Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Bundesgesundheitsamt, Case C-207/91, [1993]
E.C.R. I-3723, ¶¶ 15—26.
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European Council, this gives rise to the Irish problem.63 Ireland will
remain a Member State of the European Union, and thus of the
customs union; this would imply that there would have to be controls
on goods at the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, as
well as controls between Great Britain and Ireland. The land border is
nothing new: it has always existed, as have the unauthorized roads,
but even at the height of the Troubles, there were no systematic
passport checks on people moving from one side and borders of the
other. When Ireland became independent, it was agreed that a
common travel area would exist between it and the United Kingdom,
a state of affairs that still exists independently of the rights created by
membership of the European Union.
If the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State of the
European Union, there will need to be controls on the movement of
goods between the two States, a scenario to which no one looks
forward. When one builds fences, or strengthens borders, one
stimulates smuggling, tunneling, and more. 64 Given that neither
Ireland nor the United Kingdom is in the Schengen Area, no problem
arises on that score. However, the common travel area does pose
problems, as nationals of other Member States can come into Ireland
freely, but would have no right to reside in the United Kingdom,
unless that were to be negotiated reciprocally as part of the Brexit
deal or later. The idea of British immigration officers checking
passengers arriving in Ireland, alongside Irish officials, is not
necessarily assured of a welcome reception in Dublin. There are
though ready precedents: French authorities check travelers using the
Eurostar service from London to the Continent, and British officials
do the same at the Paris and Brussels terminals. A customs union with
the European Union might have been able to solve many issues on
trade in goods, but there would still be questions of rules of origin to
deal with, as well as dumping, and the problems as to persons would
still be there. The customs union with Turkey has been fraught with
difficulties for many years, and at WTO level it effectively means that
63. See Brian Doherty, John Temple Lang, Christopher McCrudden, Lee McGowan,
David Phinnemore & Dagmar Shiek, Northern Ireland and Brexit: the European Economic
Area Option, (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7576_
northernirelandandbrexit.pdf (addressing the prospects for Northern Ireland to become part of
the EEA).
64.
See e.g. Pigs & Bacon Commission v. McCarren & Co. Ltd., Case C-177/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 2161.
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the Turks have relatively little to say about trade policy, concessions,
hanging to a considerable extent on the coattails of the European
Union, much to the dissatisfaction of the Turks. While the United
Kingdom could have chosen simply continue to apply by
incorporation the European Union’s customs legislation as part of the
conversion program envisaged under the Great Repeal Bill, and align
itself entirely with the European Union in these matters, the Queen’s
Speech at the State Opening of Parliament on June 21, 2017 made it
clear that a separate Customs Bill would form part of a package of
measures designed to achieve Brexit, and the term “Great Repeal
Bill” made way for the simpler term “Repeal Bill”, with a series of
specialist satellite Bills.65
A solution, under which Northern Ireland would leave the
United Kingdom and become independent, or even part of Ireland on
a federal or confederal basis with religious toleration and freedom
ensured, seems as yet unachievable (no matter how economically
desirable either course might be). Yet old prejudices, when examined
closely, sometimes do not stand up to scrutiny, and political
desirability can triumph apparent religious interests. At the Battle of
the Boyne, King William, the Protestant King, carried Papal support
into battle. Success for James III would have meant agrandissement
of his supporter, Louis XIV, with whom the Pope was having a
classic row about control of the Catholic Church in France; the Pope
therefore supported the Protestant King against the Catholic King.
Given that neither the Northern Irish nor the Irish politicians want a
serious land border to return, as it might threaten the peace process,
the stimulus to think out of the box is enormous. The importance of
this aspect has been rightly highlighted in Theresa May’s letter
notifying the European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to
withdraw from the European Union, and in the European Union’s
reactions discussed above.
Finally, Brexit could well lead to the break-up of the United
Kingdom, if Scotland and/or Northern Ireland were to leave it after a
referendum and a settlement. Either or both would most likely seek to
accede to the European Union. That brings its own complications, as
Spain has hitherto not been seeking to reward secession, for fear of
65. See THE QUEEN’S SPEECH AND ASSOCIATED BACKGROUND BRIEFING,
ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT ON WEDNESDAY 21 JUNE
2017 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
620838/Queens_speech_2017_background_notes.pdf, at 17, et seq.
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encouraging would-be separatists in Spain, although some flexibility
might develop. In any event, there is no guarantee that Scotland
and/or Northern Ireland would be at the head of the queue to accede.
Another, perhaps less welcome, aspect is that a proliferation of very
small new Member States is likely to lead to Balkanization, with all
the problems that that would entail. Decision-making with a huge
number of Member States would need to be seriously reformed along
federal lines, and simplified. At the moment, this may well be
politically difficult, given the attractions of those who want the power
of decision to be nearer the people affected by it. However, many
things are simply more effectively considered and effected at a higher
level than the Nation State. Putting Ruritania first may not always be
a recipe for success in the long term.
The final obvious course of action, if a deal cannot be agreed for
preferential access for UK goods and services to the European
internal market, and preferential or reciprocal access for EU goods
and services to the UK market, is the fallback position of WTO rights.
These will be on the basis of the most favored nation principle and are
widely regarded as the least satisfactory outcome. This would be a
hard Brexit on the most disadvantageous terms for all parties; it
would be a triumph for those of little faith and even less
understanding of world trade. The United Kingdom is currently trying
to investigate the possibilities of concluding bilateral trade deals with
important partners, such as Commonwealth countries. Until it actually
leaves the European Union, the United Kingdom has no competence
to conclude bilateral trade agreements with third countries, and it is
not entirely clear that third countries will be lining up to conclude
such arrangements, despite visits from Theresa May or even Boris
Johnson. There is also the issue of whether the United Kingdom
would have to apply for separate membership of the WTO or whether
it could substitute itself out of the EU membership; this would be a
reverse of what happened under the old General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1947 when the European Communities substituted
themselves for the individual Member States.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
From the above remarks, it is apparent that most conclusions on
the consequences of Brexit must necessarily be tentative. However,
some points can be made with certainty. The European Communities
Act 1972 would be repealed. National legislation implementing prior
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EU law would remain in force unless expressly repealed as part of the
withdrawal process or afterwards, and directly applicable EU law will
be re-enacted as UK law under what is now simply called the Repeal
Bill. As has been seen, UK judges would no longer be obliged to
interpret UK law in accordance with the case law and principles
behind the case law of the ECJ in respect of post-withdrawal
developments in that case law, although the Repeal Bill will take the
sensible approach to require them look at its case law prior to Brexit
as a means of interpreting law which had originally been enacted in
order to implement EU obligations, whether or not that law had been
re-enacted. It goes without saying that the UK courts will no longer
be able to be able or obliged to make a reference for a preliminary
ruling to the ECJ under Article 267 of the TFEU. EU law will also
once more be treated as foreign law in UK courts, and would have to
be proved by evidence.
Financial aspects will also play a role, as the European Union
expects the United Kingdom to continue to pay its anticipated share
of European multiannual programs, at least for the coming few years.
The contributions to the EU pension scheme will also need to
continue to be funded, and those former European officials who have
retired and are in the United Kingdom should be entitled to receive
their pensions still subject to taxation for the benefit of the European
Union rather than UK taxation, just as those former EU officials of
British nationality who are residing in the remaining Member States
should continue to benefit from existing conditions. Under Article
28(a) of the EU Staff Regulations, it is possible for the EU institutions
to take individual decisions to appoint people who are not nationals of
an EU Member State as officials or temporary agents.66 On the same
basis, EU officials of UK nationality could be individually continued
in their existing positions: they work for the European Union and are
not there as representatives of the United Kingdom, and the
Commission has made it clear that it will do its best for them.67
The situation of UK nationals who are resident in the remaining
Member States and of the nationals of the remaining Member States
who are resident in the United Kingdom will need to be dealt with in
66. See Sᴛᴀғғ Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs ᴏғ Oғғɪᴄɪᴀʟs ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Cᴏᴍᴍᴜɴɪᴛɪᴇs (2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf.
67. See Tara Palmeri & Carmen Paun, EU leaders to UK staff: we will try to protect you
after Brexit, PU leaᴄᴏ (Jun. 24, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-to-staff-welltry-to-protect-you-after-brexit-eu-referendum-consquences-uk-leave-europe/.
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an honest and reciprocal manner.68 It would be most appropriate for
all States concerned at least to agree to honor existing rights. Possible
continuing rights of employment, establishment and service
provision, as well as possible rights for the economically inactive and
for students will all form important parts of any deal.
The debate in the United Kingdom has become no less shrill
following Theresa May’s decision to call a General Election for June
8, 2017. This was designed to take account of perceived current
disarray in the Labour Party and to seek a larger Conservative Party
majority in the House of Commons, which would leave Mrs. May less
open to the baying of the right-wing Eurosceptic wing of her party.
The result was certainly not what she expected, and she has been able
to cling on to power only through a rather shabby deal with the
Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland; this is pork-barrel
politics at its lowest. What effect (if any) the election outcome will
have on the negotiations will become apparent in due course,
although it is already being stated that Mrs. May’s negotiating red
lines do not seem to be facilitating sensible negotiations.69
The Repeal Bill, formally the European Union (Withdrawal)
Bill, was published on July 13, 2017.70 It unsurprisingly follows the
approach already announced in the White Paper, discussed above.
Equally unsurprisingly, it promptly ran into a barrage of criticism, not
least because of the Henry VIII powers it envisages. Scotland and
Wales also made their opposition plain.71 If the Scottish Parliament
and the Welsh Assembly do indeed withhold legislative assent in due
course, a major domestic constitutional crisis will loom.
In short, everything is up in the air at the moment, not least
concerning the role of the CJEU after Brexit, given the diametrically
opposed views expressed so far by the EU and British negotiators,72
68. See however, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (June
2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621848/
60093_Cm9464_NSS_SDR_Web.pdf, the poverty of which is embarrassing.
69. See Theresa May has ‘hamstrung’ David Davis in Brexit talks, BBC (June 30,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40461496.
70. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5), available at
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/cbill_2017-20190005_en_
1.htm.
71. Brexit: The UK’s key repeal bill facing challenges, BBC (July 13, 2017)
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40589510.
72. See Christopher McCrudden, An early deal-breaker? EU citizens’ rights in the UK
after Brexit, and the future role of the European Court of Justice, UK Constitutional Law
Association, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/06/27/christopher-mccrudden-an-early-deal-
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and the feeling of sauve qui peut is still prevalent. The first round has
gone to the European Union, however, as the EU’s approach of first
negotiating the terms of withdrawal and only then proceeding, once
sufficient progress has been made, to negotiate the terms of the future
relationship, has been accepted by the British negotiating team.73
The hotheaded rhetoric prevalent in certain sectors of the UK
press, and the populism of politicians plodding the path to re-election
on the back of misinformation, fear and prejudice, does not help
create a positive climate for the coming negotiations. The result of the
General Election in the United Kingdom is hardly a ringing
endorsement of Mrs. May’s strategy, but it is very clear that Jeremy
Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, after a wholly unconvincing
lukewarm endorsement of the “remain” option during the referendum
campaign, is totally unwilling to call for a reversal of the lemminglike Brexit rush, missing thereby a major political opportunity to offer
a real alternative to the myopic policy of the British Government.
Reliance on the expertise of civil servants will be necessary, and a
return to quiet diplomacy and negotiation would benefit all
concerned. The impression at the moment is that those most
concerned realize the importance of this. But the outcome of the
Brexit negotiations, and the viability of Mrs. May’s administration,
are distinctly shrouded in haze. We will simply, like Asquith, have to
“wait and see.”74

breaker-eu-citizens-rights-in-the-uk-after-brexit-and-the-future-role-of-the-european-court-ofjustice/.
73. See Rob Merrick, Brexit talks: UK caves in to EU’s demand that divorce terms are
established before future trade deals, INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2017), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-talks-negotiations-latest-uk-eu-divorce-dealgovernment-agrees-caves-in-before-trade-deal-a7798076.html.
74. The phrase was used by Asquith often in 1910. See Rᴏʏ Jᴇɴᴋɪɴs, Asǫᴜɪᴛʜ, ch.14,
(Harper Collins, 1964).
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